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Political Factors and the Adoption of the Merit System of 
Judicial Selection 
 
Joshua E. Montgomery 
 
Abstract 
There is widespread debate among politicians and academics as to the effectiveness 
and appropriateness of the merit system of judicial selection.  Much of the literature on 
this subject is dedicated to the effects of the merit system after it has been adopted.  The 
purpose of this paper was to examine the effects of certain political factors that may 
have created a political environment conducive to the adoption of the merit system.  In 
this paper, three hypotheses were postulated and subsequently tested.  The results of 
each test, while not as conclusive as anticipated, confirmed each of the hypotheses.  The 
first conclusion of this study was that states are more likely than not to have the same 
party in control of both houses of the state legislature.  The second conclusion was that 
states that adopted the merit system experienced a smaller amount of majority-party 
change in both houses of their legislatures prior to the adoption of the merit system 
than states that did not adopt the merit system.  The final conclusion was that most 
states are more likely to adopt the merit system when they are bordered by other states 
that have the merit system.   
1. Introduction 
 
The merit system of judicial selection is the process by which the governor of a 
particular state selects a person from a short list of candidates, which is compiled by a 
non-partisan nominating commission. The nominating commission then appoints that 
person as a judge for a short, initial term. After serving out the initial term, the judge 
runs in a retention election (Dubois, 1990).  In a retention election, the judge does not 
run against any other candidates and does not run on any party platform.  Instead, the 
judge runs against his or her record and wins re-election by garnering a specified 
percentage of votes approving his or her retention of the judgeship (Canes-Wrone, 
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Clark, & Park, 2010). If a judge is retained, he or she then serves a full term in office 
(Dubois, 1990).  The merit system is a method of selecting judges that is increasingly 
being implemented in the United States, and as such, it is an intriguing area of study.  
There has been a substantial amount of research regarding this topic in areas such as 
judicial decision making patterns of judges selected through the merit system, voter 
confidence in different methods of judicial decision making, and the role of money in 
judicial campaigns.  Interestingly, the majority of the research regarding the merit 
system has focused on the effects of the merit system once it has been adopted, but not 
much of the research has focused on the events and conditions which may have led to the 
adoption of the merit system.   
 
2. Literature Review: Merit Selection in the States 
There has been a substantial amount of scholarly research devoted to the study of 
the evolving methods of judicial selection in the states.  This body of research has been 
conducted over the last several decades and has sought to determine the consequences 
of judicial reform.  There has been research conducted which suggests that adoption of 
the merit system can increase judicial independence and there has been research that is 
inconclusive on the subject.  Similarly, there has been research conducted which 
investigates the positive and negative impact of money on judicial campaigns. Perhaps 
more relevant to the subject of this paper are the studies investigating the ability – or 
inability – of the merit selection to mitigate the negative impact of money on judicial 
campaigns, and ultimately the impact of money on judicial decisions made once judges 
are in office.  Lastly, research has been conducted regarding the impact of campaigns on 
judicial decision-making. 
 
2.1 A Brief History of the American Judiciary  
Before discussing specific changes that have taken place over time in state judicial 
selection methods, it is necessary to examine the origins of the modern American 
judiciary and the values on which it was founded.  Even before the time that the United 
States of America was formally founded as a sovereign country, it was argued that the 
judiciary should be independent from the other branches of government.  In the mid-
1700s, there was much agitation within the American colonies regarding the influence 
of the King of England on colonial judiciaries (Bailyn, 1967). The colonial governments 
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feared that justices who received their commissions and salaries from the Crown (the 
King of England) would not be able to effectively serve the role of a proper judiciary.  
The role of a proper judiciary, according to John Dickinson, was to “settle the contests 
between prerogative and liberty… to ascertain the bounds of sovereign power, and to 
determine the rights of the subject,” (as quoted in Bailyn, 1967, p. 74).  The colonies 
argued that these duties of a proper judiciary could not be fulfilled by a judiciary 
dependent on the Crown for its commissions and salaries, especially when the 
commissions could be easily revoked.  In addition to many other important issues, these 
frustrations over the interference of the British executive in the American colonies’ 
judiciaries led to the American Revolution, which ultimately ended with the United 
States of America gaining independence from the British.   
The values on which the modern American judiciary was created were in place even 
before United States was founded. The concepts of accountability, independence, and 
impartiality were the cornerstones of the American judiciary. As John Dickinson 
expressed, proper government must be accountable to the people, and the judiciary was 
no exception (Bailyn, 1967).  In Dickinson’s view, the judiciary should, however, be 
independent from the executive. At the time of Dickinson’s writing of his Letters from a 
Farmer in Pennsylvania, the governing executive was the King of England, and the 
judiciary was not independent from the executive (Bailyn, 1967).  Some political figures 
of that time, such as John Adams, made the assertion that the jury system, which 
allowed for a trial-by-jury, allowed citizens to share in both judicial proceedings and the 
execution of laws (Bailyn, 1967).  However, in some colonies, even jury trials were 
deemed illegal by the British government.  The third important value, impartiality, was 
nearly impossible to realize in colonial America.  The following excerpt from Bailyn’s 
Origins of the American Revolution effectively summarizes the frustrations of colonial 
Americans on the subject of the judiciary: 
“Unless the judiciary could stand upon its own firm and independent 
foundations – unless, that is, judges held their positions by permanent tenure in 
no way dependent upon the will and pleasure of the executive – it would be 
ridiculous “to look for strict impartiality and a pure administration of justice, to 
expect that power should be confined within its legal limits, and right and justice 
done to the subject.” (Bailyn, 1967, p. 74-75).  
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As the following sections of this paper will show, there was not one system of 
judicial selection that was adopted in every state.  While the colonies, and later states, 
could agree that the British executive’s direct involvement in the American judiciary 
was both unconstitutional and problematic, finding a standard alternative was less 
simple. However, in every state, judges were either directly elected by the people or 
were appointed and confirmed by popularly elected officials (National Center for State 
Courts, 2015). 
2.2. The Concept of Merit 
 The Merriam-Webster dictionary provides three definitions of the word “merit,” 
and they are as follows: 1) a good quality that deserves to be praised, 2) the quality of 
being good, important, or useful, and 3) having value or worth (Merriam-Webster, 
2015).  In the context of the judiciary, a judge who has merit would be a person who is 
qualified for and competent in that position.  Merriam-Webster also provides a 
definition of a “merit system.” A “Merit system” is defined as “a system by which 
appointments and promotions in the civil service are based on competence rather than 
political favoritism,” (Merriam-Webster, 2015).  Based solely on these definitions, a 
merit system of judicial selection sounds like an ideal method for selecting justices.  
However, the concept of merit in American politics is not as simple as these definitions 
may lead one to believe. 
The United States Constitution remains fairly quiet on the requirements for justices 
of the Supreme Court, and leaves the creation of state courts up to the state legislatures.  
As Frost and Lindquist note, the United States were created as a constitutional 
democracy, which gives its citizens the right to govern themselves, albeit almost always 
through indirect means (2010). The United States were founded partially on the liberal 
democratic ideals of individual rights, freedom, and equality, which are realized 
through free and fair elections, as evidenced in the text of the Constitution (U.S. Const. 
art I; Rautenfeld, 2004). However, the American Bar Association notes that the original 
thirteen states did not have direct elections of their state judges, but rather judges were 
selected through gubernatorial appointments or legislative appointments (2000).  The 
liberal democratic values of free and fair elections do not guarantee that the person 
most qualified to serve in any particular office will be elected to that office.  In other 
words, the person with the most merit may not be elected to office.   
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As more and more states modified their judicial selection methods towards direct 
elections and away from appointments, it could be argued that the methods of judicial 
selection were beginning to be more closely aligned with liberal democratic values 
(ABA Standing Committee on Judicial Independence, 2000).  However, as the American 
Bar Association has repeatedly pointed out, direct elections of judges became 
increasingly political and more prone to foster both corruption and biased rulings – 
things the United States were founded in an attempt to avoid (2000).  The so-called 
“merit system” seeks to protect individual rights through fair and unbiased rulings that 
uphold the rule of law, (laws which provide for the protection of individual rights), 
through a system that seeks to place a judge with the greatest merit – the person most 
qualified to make a correct and unbiased ruling –  in the adjudicating position (ABA 
Standing Committee on Judicial Independence, 2000).  The merit system does not ignore 
the voice of the people, however, as it requires judges to face a yes-or-no retention 
election every several years, in which the voting public directly decides if a judge will 
continue to serve. 
Interestingly, while corruption within the judiciary has always been a concern in this 
country, the perceived catalyst of that corruption has shifted over the years.  In 
America’s formative years, ties to the executive branch of government were initially 
seen as the primary source of corruption (Bailyn, 1967).  In the last several decades, the 
threat of corruption in the judiciary is perceived as stemming from the increasingly 
political nature of judicial campaigns (Frost & Lindquist, 2010).  While the American 
judiciary is independent from the executive branch of the government, proponents of 
the merit system argue that a judiciary independent of corrupting political pressures is 
necessary (Frost & Lindquist, 2010; ABA Standing Committee on Judicial 
Independence, 2000; and ABA Coalition of Justice, 2008).  Lastly, the concept of 
impartiality is one that proponents of the merit system say is more easily attainable 
through the merit system than through other selection methods.  Not only are judicial 
candidates chosen by a number of knowledgeable individuals based on their merit, but 
they must run against their record after a short initial term (Frost & Lindquist, 2010; 
ABA Standing Committee on Judicial Independence, 2000; and ABA Coalition of 
Justice, 2008).  One could even say that in the merit system, primary retention elections 




2.3 American Bar Association Guidelines for the Merit System 
The American Bar Association has set forth a set of standards after which states can 
model their judicial selection systems in a report titled “Standards on State Judicial 
Selection” (2000). The standards were established in an attempt to help states establish 
efficient judicial selection systems that select the most qualified candidates.  The 
standards were presented in three sections: Part A: Judicial Selection and Retention 
Criteria, Part B: Primary Actors in Selection Process, and Part C: Supporting Actors in 
Selection Process (ABA Standing Committee on Judicial Independence, 2000).  Part A 
outlines criteria and qualifications for selection and retention of judges.  In order to be 
selected as a possible candidate, an individual must meet certain experience, integrity, 
competence, temperament, and commitment-to-the-law criteria.  In order for a judge to 
be retained, the ABA’s standards call for the examination of a judges behavior while in 
office, and provide criteria for doing so.  Part B outlines the actors that should be 
present in the selection process.  These actors include: the Judicial Eligibility 
Commission, the Judicial Nominating Commission, the appointing authority, the 
endorsing authority, and the retention evaluation body (ABA Standing Committee on 
Judicial Independence, 2000).  The final section of the report identifies who the 
supporting actors may be in the judicial selection process.  These include: bar 
associations, judicial candidates, individual attorneys, public and private organizations, 
and media interests (ABA Standing Committee on Judicial Independence, 2000). 
2.4 The “Missouri Plan” and Changes in State Selection Methods 
In his article “Learning about Judicial Independence: Institutional Change in the 
State Courts”, Hanssen noted that there are currently five distinct methods of selecting 
judges in the American States.  Those methods are 1) partisan elections, 2) non-partisan 
elections, 3) gubernatorial appointment, 4) legislative appointment, and 5) the merit 
system, which combines appointment and election components (2004).  In the early 
years of the United States, judges – many of whom had ties to the Royal Crown in 
England – were trusted less than elected representatives from among the American 
people, who were seen as more able to fairly govern citizens (Hanssen, 2004). As such, 
the judiciaries in the states were highly accountable to their respective legislatures.  
Throughout the following decades as the nation grew and evolved, the courts were 
given more independence.  Many state courts modified their selection methods, 
changing from gubernatorial and legislative appointments to partisan elections 
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(Hanssen, 2004).  This gave the courts a great deal of independence from the executive 
and legislative branches.  
 Sometime around the early 1900s, public concern began to arise regarding 
partisan judicial elections.  The adoption of partisan elections did indeed give state 
judges a level of independence, albeit only from the other branches of government 
(Hanssen, 2004). While judges gained independence from the other branches of 
government, they also became tethered by the partisan politics through which they 
obtained their offices.  Hanssen (2004) asserted that many states eventually moved to 
non-partisan elections in an attempt to mitigate the ability of “partisan forces” to 
capture elections (448).  After several more decades, the merit system of judicial 
selection was adopted in 1940 in Missouri, marking a new era of change in state courts 
(Dubois, 1990).  
The merit system of judicial selection that has been adopted in many states was first 
introduced in 1914 by a University of Northwestern Law Professor by the name of 
Albert M. Kales. It has since become known as the “Missouri Plan”, after Missouri 
became the first state to adopt it in 1940 (Dubois, 1990).  As Puro et al. noted, after 
Missouri adopted the merit system in 1940, it was "virtually ignored for eighteen years 
and then adopted, in fairly rapid succession, by nineteen additional states over the next 
eighteen years” (as cited in Dubois, 1990, p. 25).  States began to implement the merit 
system to select their judges in varying ways.  In the majority of states, this was 
accomplished through the passage of state constitutional amendments.  The specifics of 
these amendments, such as the role of the state bar association in creating nominating 
commissions were formal, constitutional agreements, while others were merely spoken 
agreements between the governor and the state bar (Sheldon, 1977).  Most of the states 
that adopted the merit system did so between 1958 and 1976, which is a relatively short 
amount of time when considering how long these states have established judiciaries 
(Dubois, 1990).  It is possible that states are more likely to enact institutional change 
when they have had a chance to observe the same change in a neighboring state, and it 
is one of the hypotheses of this paper that such is the case. 
2.5 Merit Selection and Judicial Independence 
One of the main areas of debate and research with regards to the merit system is its 
impact on judicial independence. In his article Methods of Judicial Selection and their 
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Impact on Judicial Independence, Gardner-Geyh defines an independent judiciary as one 
that is “insulated from political and other controls that could undermine their impartial 
judgment” (2008).  Gardner-Geyh noted that judicial independence is widely regarded 
within legal professions as positive and necessary for the judiciary to uphold the rule of 
law (2008).  Canes-Wrone, Clark, & Park also noted that societal benefits such as civil 
liberties and economic growth are associated with Judicial independence and assert that 
the legitimacy of the courts hinges on judicial independence (2010). On the other side of 
the debate is the concept of judicial accountability - which can be described as 
promoting institutional responsibility within the courts and collectively holding judges 
accountable for their actions as the third branch of government (Gardner-Geyh, 2008).  
Often, these two concepts – judicial independence and judicial accountability – conflict 
with one another.  It is argued that the more publicly accountable judges are, the less 
independent they are (Canes-Wrone, Clark, & Park, 2010).   
 
The merit system was developed in attempt to balance these two important aspects 
of the American Judiciary.  When considering how best to balance these two aspects, it 
is important first consider several preliminary questions.  As Harold See asked in his 
article Judicial Selection and Decisional Independence, what is an appropriate level of 
popular control in any particular state? (1998). See (1998) pointed out that if judges in a 
particular state have acted as a “superlegislature”, meaning that judges use their 
positions to “implement their own public policy predilections”, then it may be most 
appropriate for the public to select judges in the same way they select their legislators 
(p. 144).  The second question See raised dealt with the frame of reference one uses 
when evaluating the merits of elections and/or appointments.  See (1998) asked “what 
system offers the public the level of judicial accountability that is appropriate to the way 
in which judges function and are expected to function in their jurisdiction?” (p. 144).  
See (1998) urged caution and consideration of the differences among each state when 
answering this question.  See’s third and final recommendation was for reformers and 
legal professionals to carefully examine the factors which have caused unrest with 
current judicial selection methods.  These factors will likely include things such as the 
tone of judicial elections – whether the campaign is civil and about issues or whether it 




As Canes-Wrone, Clark, and Park stated in their study titled Judicial Independence and 
Retention Elections, a common assumption is that the absence of a contested judicial 
election will lead to judicial independence (2010).  Research conducted by Franklin 
(2002) and Caldarone, et al (2009) argues that the afore-mentioned assumption is well-
founded and claim that judicial independence is indeed more achievable through the 
merit system than it is through elections (Canes-Wrone, Clark, & Park, 2010). Canes-
Wrone, Clark, & Park’s research led them to a significantly different conclusion than 
Franklin and Caldarone, et al reached.  Canes-Wrone, Clark, and Park analyzed both 
state supreme court decisions on the issue of abortion and public opinion regarding 
abortion from 1980 to present.  Their results showed that, contrary to the common 
assumption, as public opinion on abortion shifted more in favor of abortion, judges 
began deciding cases in a more pro-life fashion (Canes-Wrone, Clark, & Park, 2010). As 
shown by the conflicting results of these studies mentioned above, the scholarship on 
the subject of merit selection and its impact on judicial independence is divided and 
inconclusive. 
 
2.6 Merit Selection, Money, and Politics 
An area of ever-increasing debate and research is being devoted to the increasing 
amounts of money that are being spent on judicial campaigns.  The impact of money on 
judicial selection is an important one because the amount of money spent on judicial 
campaigns, if excessive, could potentially upset the balance of judicial independence 
and accountability (Shepherd, 2009).  In her article Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 
Shepherd pointed out that roughly ninety percent of all judicial matters in the United 
States are handled through the State courts, and roughly ninety percent of all state-court 
judges are elected through elections of one form or another (2009).  When these two 
numbers are considered together, it becomes apparent that the vast majority of judicial 
matters at some point are handled by judges who either gained or retained their office 
through an election.  The results of Shepherd’s study of State Supreme Court decisions 
from all fifty states in the United States revealed two major findings.  The first was that 
elections, particularly partisan elections, are much more likely to be heavily contested 
than other methods of judicial selection, and the second major finding was that judges 
up for re-election in partisan elections were likely to appeal to their “retention agents” – 
the voting public – in order to keep their jobs by ruling in non-controversial and 
popular ways (Shepherd, 2009).  The combination of these two findings creates a 
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situation in which the rule of law and pursuit of justice can become secondary to re-
election. 
Shephard’s study also investigated the effects money can have on the voting habits 
of judges.  By measuring how likely judges were to vote in favor of certain groups 
which made campaign contributions in both partisan and non-partisan elections, 
Shephard was able to determine that there was a correlation (2009).  Shephard 
investigated the relationship between the voting patterns of judges in cases dealing 
with pro-business groups, pro-labor groups, doctors and hospitals, insurance 
companies, and lawyer groups.  Shephard found that, with the exception of lawyer 
groups who made campaign contributions, judges are more likely to vote in favor of 
groups that made financial contributions to their campaigns (2009).  Importantly, 
Shephard pointed out that while there was a correlation between campaign 
contributions and the voting patterns of judges, the data could not specify which way 
the causality ran (2009). Essentially, Shephard’s data could not definitively say that the 
campaign contributions influenced the judges’ decisions, and not vice versa. 
The above-described phenomenon was discussed at length by Martin Redish and 
Jenifer Aronoff in their article, The Real Constitutional Problem with State Judicial Selection: 
Due Process, Judicial Retention, and the Dangers of Popular Constitutionalism (2014).  In this 
article, Redish and Aronoff take a position which is similar to the position reached by 
Shepherd.  While Shephard’s data and conclusions seem to be predicated on the 
assumption that influences on judges deciding cases are inherently bad, Redish and 
Aronoff (2014) take a more legally-minded approach to the issue, particularly in the 
area of due process.  Redish and Aronoff (2014) state that, “requiring judges to submit 
to popularly grounded methodologies to remain in office violates core constitutional 
values both in theory and in practice” (p. 33).  Here the authors are simply 
acknowledging that judges have a right to rule against popular opinion if they believe 
such a ruling is appropriate.  The authors quote U. S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin 
Scalia in his explanation of due process and elections when he stated that: 
“Elected judges—regardless of whether they have announced any views 
beforehand—always face the pressure of an electorate who might disagree with 
their rulings and therefore vote them off the bench.... So if, as Justice Ginsburg 
claims, it violates due process for a judge to sit in a case in which ruling one way 
rather than another increases his prospects for reelection, then—quite simply—
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the practice of electing judges is itself a violation of due process.“ (Redish & 
Aronoff, 2014, p. 18). 
Redish and Aronoff (2014) acknowledge that here Scalia correctly identifies the 
problem with the claim that elections as a means of judicial retention violates due 
process.  However, Redish and Aronoff (2014) also assert that in his explanation, Justice 
Scalia also concedes the real problem with judicial elections: they make judges more apt 
to rule in ways that are more compatible with voters’ preferences than they are to rule 
in a less popular fashion, even if the less-popular ruling is the correct one. 
The title of Choi, Gulati, and Posner’s article is a succinct summary of the conflicting 
opinions on methods of judicial selection in the states – Professionals or Politicians: The 
Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary (2008).  Choi, Gulati 
and Posner’s study investigated three aspects of judicial performance: opinion quality, 
productivity (number of opinions written), and independence (2008).  The authors 
analyzed a set of high court opinions from every state over a period of three years.  The 
author’s results presented some interesting conclusions.  Elected judges were found to 
be more productive than appointed judges (Choi, Guati, & Posner, 2008).  Productivity 
was defined as the total number of opinions written in one year by a judge.  When 
opinion quality was considered, the opinions of appointed judges were found to be 
higher than the opinions of elected judges (Choi, Guati, & Posner, 2008).  Opinion 
quality was defined by the number of out-of-state citation the opinions received.  Lastly, 
independence of both sets of judges was examined.  The results on independence were 
inconclusive, as elected judges and appointed judges enjoyed very similar amounts of 
independence – a finding not in line with the author’s original hypothesis (Choi, Guati, 
& Posner, 2008).  Overall, the results of this comprehensive research study seem to 
suggest that the conventional wisdom, which holds that appointed judges are more 
independent and thus better than elected judges, may not be well-founded and should 
be more closely examined. 
2.7 The Current State of Affairs 
As Redish and Aronoff stated, currently thirty-nine states have some form of 
election through which their state court judges are selected (2014).  The election method 
in these thirty-nine states may be partisan, non-partisan, or retention elections after an 
initial appointment (Redish & Aronoff, 2014).  Choi, Gulati, and Posner (2008) and Keele 
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(2014) further broke down the current systems used by the states.  However, Keele’s 
numbers are most recent, so they will be used as the data source for the current state 
judicial selection systems.  Currently, eight states select their judges through partisan 
public elections, fourteen states select judges through non-partisan public elections, four 
states use some form of gubernatorial appointment, and two states use legislative 
appointment to select judges.  Another fourteen employ a merit selection system in 
which a governor chooses from the nominating commission’s candidates, and eight 
states use a merit system in which the selected candidates must receive legislative or 
other consent (Redish & Aronoff, 2014).  Redish and Aronoff’s list of judicial selection 
systems has depicted visually in Figure 2.7a below. 
 
Figure 2.7a 
System of Selection Number of States Employing System 
Partisan Public Elections Eight (8) 
Non-Partisan Public Elections Fourteen (14) 
Gubernatorial Appointment Four (4) 
Legislative Appointment Two (2) 
Merit System 
Twenty-Two (22) – 14 governor-selected, 8 
governor-selected and legislatively confirmed 
(Redish & Aronoff, 2014) 
 
3. Hypothesis & Model 
This paper investigated the impact of three variables on the decisions of states to 
change their judicial selection methods from popular elections or appointments to a 
merit system of judicial selection.  This was accomplished by testing several variables in 
twenty-four states. This paper primarily researched two aspects of the political 
environment that may be correlated to the adoption of the merit system.  These two 
factors are, 1) the patterns of legislative elections, and 2) the adoption of the merit 




The first hypothesis states that States that made the change to the merit system of 
judicial selection were more likely to be governed by the Republican Party at the time of 
the change than by the Democratic Party.  Because the merit system, at least 
theoretically, provides judges with more insulation from politics, it is expected that the 
merit system will be implemented by primarily Republican-majority state legislatures.  
It is no secret that in American politics, Democrats tend to be more progressive than 
Republicans.  For this reason, it is expected that a judicial selection system which allows 
justices to serve 8-year terms and be relatively isolated from public opinion would be 
appealing to Republican legislatures. 
The second hypothesis states that States experience a greater level of consistency in 
the majority party in the years leading up to the time the state made the change to the 
merit system of judicial selection than states that did not adopt the merit system.  The 
reasoning behind this claim is simple.  As has been discussed already, one of the selling 
points for supporters of the merit system is that the merit system balances 
independence and accountability and minimizes the role politics play in the courts (See, 
1998; Canes-Wrone, Clark & Park, 2010).  It seems that a state legislature that has been 
governed by one party for a period of at least several elections may not look kindly on 
an increasingly politicized judicial selection process.  Thus, the hypothesis holds that 
states will adopt the merit system after a long period of majority governance by one 
party. 
The third hypothesis states that states that adopted the merit system were more 
likely to be surrounded by other states that had already adopted the merit system than 
are states that did not adopt the merit system.  The reasoning behind this hypothesis is 
simple.  States may be hesitant to implement an entirely new form of judicial selection if 
they have not had a chance to see it in action.  However, based on that same logic, if a 
state is bordered by one or more states which have enacted the Missouri Plan, that state 
may be more likely to adopt the merit system for itself.   
 
4. Research Design 
The three hypotheses that were tested were: 1) States that made the change to the 
merit system of judicial selection were more likely to be governed by the Republican 
Party at the time of the change than by the Democratic Party, 2) States experience a 
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greater level of consistency in the majority party in the years leading up to the time the 
state made the change to the merit system of judicial selection than states that did not 
adopt the merit system, and 3) States that adopted the merit system were surrounded 
by other states which had already adopted the merit system.  Each hypothesis was 
tested using a specifically designed research method.  The research methods designed 
for all three hypotheses are discussed in detail below. 
 
4.1 Hypothesis 1 
The first hypothesis was that States that made the change to the merit system of 
judicial selection were more likely to be governed by the Republican Party at the time of 
the change than by the Democratic Party.  This was tested by recording which party 
was in the majority at the time the merit system was adopted in twelve states’ appellate 
courts.  The states in the data set are mid-western and western states, with the exception 
of Florida.  The states that were examined were Arizona, Tennessee, Florida, Iowa, 
Indiana, Missouri, South Dakota, Kansas, Wyoming, Colorado, and Utah.  The majority 
party in both the House of Representatives and Senate for each state within the data set 
was measured.  
The findings are organized in a chart in Figure 4.1a below.  The states which were 
the subject of this study are listed in column 1.  Column 2 lists the years in which the 
merit system was adopted by each state within the data set. Tennessee has two dates 
listed because the merit system was adopted once, repealed, and adopted again 
(National Center for State Courts, 2015).  Column 3 lists the majority party in the House 
of Representatives of each corresponding state at the time of the adoption of the merit 
system in said state.  Lastly, column 4 lists the majority party in each state’s Senate at 
the time of the adoption of the merit system in said state. In columns 3 and 4, a lower-
case “r” was used to represent the Republican Party as the majority for a particular 











2. Year Merit System 
Adopted** 
3. Majority Party in 
Year Merit System 
Adopted (House)*** 
4. Majority Party in 
Year Merit System 
Adopted (Senate) 
Arizona 1974 r r  
Tennessee 1971*, 1994 D  D  
Florida 1976 D D 
Oklahoma 1987 D D 
Iowa 1962 r r 
Indiana 1970 r r 
Missouri 1940 D D 
South Dakota 1980 r r 
Kansas 1972 r r 
Wyoming 1972 r r 
Utah 1985 r r 
Colorado 1966 r r 
Totals: r =8, D =4 r =8, D =4 
* Tennessee adopted the merit system for all appellate courts in 1971 via an amendment, 
but repealed the amendment in 1974.  20 years later, Tennessee once again adopted the 
merit system for all appellate courts.  Democrats had the majority in Tennessee in both 
houses from 1970 - 1994 (National Center for State Courts, 2015; Dubin, 2007). 
**Data in Column 2 was derived from the National Center for State Courts (2015). 
***Data in Columns 3 and 4 was derived from Michael Dubin’s Party Affiliations in the State 
Legislatures: A Year by Year Summary, 1796-2006 (2007). 
 
The findings shown above in Figure 4.1a are not as strong as what was originally 
expected.  As is shown in columns 3 and 4, two-thirds of states that adopted the merit 
system did so with a majority of Republicans in both the State House and State Senate.  
The results indicate that there is indeed a statistical correlation between a majority 
Republican House and Senate. However, this correlation is not as strong as was 
originally expected.  Based on the data shown in Figure 4a, 66.6% of states had a 
majority Republican House of Representatives and Senate at the time those states 
adopted the merit system.  Also, the remaining 33.3% of states had a majority of 
Democrats in their House of Representatives and Senate at the time of their adoption of 
the merit system.   
What is interesting about the findings is the consistency within each state in terms of 
the majority party.  While the majority party was not the same for all of the states which 
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were measured, regardless of which party was in the majority, the same majority party 
was in control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate for each state.  While 
this was not an aspect that the original hypothesis sought to measure, it is nonetheless 
noteworthy.  Having both houses of the state legislature controlled by the same 
majority party is certainly not uncommon, while at the same time the presence of a 
different majority party in each of a state’s legislative houses in not uncommon either 
(Dubin, 2015).  Based on the data in Figure 4.1a, it can certainly be said that there is a 
strong correlation between 1) the adoption of the merit system by a state and 2) single-
party control of both houses of that particular state’s legislature. 
 
4.2 Hypothesis 2 
The second hypothesis was that States experience a greater level of consistency in 
the majority party in the years leading up to the time the state made the change to the 
merit system of judicial selection than states that did not adopt the merit system.  It was 
expected that states would not experience a great deal of legislative unrest prior to the 
adoption of the merit system.  For the purposes of this study, legislative unrest will be 
defined as the change in majority party after an election. This occurs when one party is 
voted into the majority over the current majority party.  This hypothesis was tested by 
comparing twelve states that have adopted the merit system – the variable group - to 
twelve states that have not adopted the merit system – the control group.   
The pattern of the change in majority party was measured in each of twenty-four 
mostly-mid-western and western states.  The variable group, which was comprised of 
states which have adopted the merit system, included Arizona, Colorado, Florida, 
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Wyoming.  
The control group, which was comprised of states which have not adopted the merit 
system, included Arkansas, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Texas, and Wisconsin.   
The period of measurement for each state in the variable group was the two decades 
of elections preceding the adoption of the merit system in each state.  The actual 
calendar-year time period varied for each state because the states being studied adopted 
the merit system at different times.  For instance, in Iowa, the period of measurement 
was from 1942 until 1962 because Iowa adopted the merit system in 1962, whereas the 
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period of measurement for Indiana was 1950 to 1970 because Indiana adopted the merit 
system in 1970. 
The period of measurement for each state in the control group, (with the exceptions 
of Michigan and Mississippi), was 1952-1974.  These twenty-two years were selected to 
be measured because 1973 was the average year in which the twelve states in the 
variable group adopted the merit system.  Since most states only held elections in even 
years, the period of measurement was expanded to twenty-two years.  Kentucky and 
Mississippi, which held elections on odd years, were the exceptions.  The time period of 
measurement for Kentucky was 1953-1973.  Due to the fact that Mississippi only held 
elections every four years, the period of measurement for Mississippi was expanded to 
the twenty-four years between 1951 and 1975.  This was done in an attempt to cover the 
time period of measurement used for the other ten states. 
For the variable group, which is depicted in Figure 4.2a, with the exception of 
Kansas, all of the states being studied held legislative elections every two years for both 
legislative houses.  Kansas’ Senate held elections every four years during the twenty-
year time period which was measured.  Eleven election cycles were measured for both 
houses in all states within the data set, except in the Kansas Senate, which only held 6 
elections. Column 1 of Figure 4.2a lists the states in the variable group.  Columns 2 and 
3 show the pattern of change in majority party after each election in the state’s House of 
Representatives and Senate, respectively.  The only two parties in control of the state 
legislatures were the Republican and Democratic parties.  Each letter in Columns 2 and 
3 corresponds to the majority party in control after an election.  A lowercase “r” 
represents the Republican Party, and a capital “D” represents the Democratic Party. For 
example, if over three elections, the Republicans have the majority in the first two 
elections and the Democrats took the majority in the third election, this would be 
depicted as “rr D” in Figure 4.2a.  In the instance that neither party held a majority in a 
particular election, a capital “T” is used to represent this occurrence.  A tie (“T”) is 
counted as a change in majority party.  In the instance of a tie, neither party has the 
required majority to pass laws, so a tie is considered a change in majority party, as 
listed in columns 4 and 5. 
 Columns 4 and 5 of Figure 4.2a list the number of changes between majority parties 
over the twenty-year measurement period for the state houses of representatives and 
state senates, respectively.  These two columns, (4 and 5), depict the level of legislative 
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unrest in each state’s legislature in the 11 elections prior to the adoption of the merit 
system.  Essentially, the larger the number of changes, the greater the amount of 
legislative unrest present in a particular state.  Column 6 lists the year in which the 
merit system was adopted by each state.  Column 7 shows the time period which was 
measured for each state. 
For the control group, which is depicted in Figure 4.2b, all of the data is depicted in 
the same fashion as it is Figure 4.2a.  Column 1 lists the states in the control group, and 
columns 2 and 3 show the pattern of change in each state’s House of Representatives 
and Senate, respectively.  Columns 4 and 5 show the number of changes in majority 
party in each state’s House of Representatives and Senate, respectively, and Column 6 
lists the time period of measurement for each state.
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2. Pattern of Election 
(House)**** 
3. Pattern of Election 
(Senate) 
4. Number of 
Changes in Majority 
Party (House) 
5. Number of 
Changes in Majority 
Party (Senate) 
6. Year Merit 
System Adopted*** 
7. Time Period of 
Measurement 
Arizona DDDDDD rrrrr DDDDDD rrrr D 1 2 1974 1954-1974 
Colorado r D rrr DDD r D r rrrrr DDD rrr 6 2 1966 1946-1966 
Florida DDDDDDDDDDDDD** DDDDDDDDDDDDD** 0 0 1976 1956-1976 
Indiana rrrr D rr D rrr rrrrr D r DD rr 4 4 1970 1950-1970 
Iowa rrrrrrrrrrr rrrrrrrrrrr 0 0 1962 1942-1962 
Kansas rrrrrrrrrrr rrrrrr* 0 0 1972 1952-1972 
Missouri r D rrr DDDDDD r DDDDDDDDDD 3 1 1940 1920-1940 
Oklahoma DDDDDDDDDDD  DDDDDDDDDDD  0 0 1987 1967-1987 
South Dakota rrrrrr T rrrr rrrrrr DD rrr 2 2 1980 1960-1980 
Tennessee DDDDDDDDDDD DDDDDDDDDDD 0 0 1971*, 1994 1974-1994 
Utah rr D r D rrrrr rrrr DD rrrr 4 2 1985 1965-1984 
Wyoming r T r D rr D rrrr rrrrrrrrrrr 6 0 1972 1952-1972 
Average Number of Changes: 2.167 1.0834   
* Tennessee adopted the merit system for all appellate courts in 1971 via an amendment, but repealed the amendment in 1974.  20 years later, Tennessee 
once again adopted the merit system for all appellate courts.  Democrats had the majority in Tennessee in both houses from 1970 - 1994 (National Center 
for State Courts, 2015; Dubin, 2007).  
**Due to legislative reapportionment, there were 2 elections held in Florida in both 1962 and 1966 (Dubin, 2015). 
***Data in Columns 1 and 6 derived from the National Center for State Courts (2015). 




Figure 4.2b – Control Group 
1. States Not 
Employing Merit 
System 
2. Pattern of Election 
(House) 
3. Pattern of Election 
(Senate) 
4. Number of 
Changes in Majority 
Party (House) 
5. Number of Changes 
in Majority Party 
(Senate) 
6. Time Period of 
Measurement 
Arkansas DDDDDDDDDDDD DDDDDDDDDDDD 0 0 
1952-1974* 
Illinois rrr D rr D rrrr D rrrrrrrr T r D 5 3 
Kentucky DDDDDDDDDDD  DDDDDDDDDDD  0 0 1953-1973 
Michigan rrr T rr D r DDDD rrrrrr D r T D 5 4 
1952-1974 
Minnesota r DDDD rrrrr DD rrrrr D 3 1 
Mississippi DDDDDD DDDDDD 0 0 1951-1975 
Montana r DDD rr D rrr D rr DDDDDDDDDD 5 1 
1952-1974 
New Mexico r DDDDDDDDDDD DDDDDDD 1 0 
North Dakota rrrrrrrrrrrr rrrrrr D rrrrr 0 2 
Ohio rrr D rrrrrr DD rrr D rr T rrrr D 3 5 
Texas DDDDDDDDDDDD DDDDDDDDDDDD 0 0 
Wisconsin rrr D rr D rr DDD rrrrrrrrrrr D 5 1 
Average Number of Changes: 2.25 1.4167   
*The time period of measurement for each state was the 22-year period from 1952-1974.  This number is based off of the average year in 
which the 12 states in Figure 4.2a adopted the merit system, which was 1973.  Because most states held elections only on even years, the 
period of measurement was expanded to cover the 21 years prior to the average merit-system adoption date of 1973.  Kentucky and 
Mississippi, which held elections on odd years, were the exceptions.  The time period of measurement for Kentucky was 1953-1973.  The 




The data results are consistent with the original hypothesis overall, although the 
results are not as strong as originally expected. The original hypothesis predicted that 
states would experience a greater level of consistency in the majority party in the years 
leading up to the time the state made the change to the merit system of judicial selection 
than states that did not adopt the merit system.  The average number of changes in 
majority party over the time period of measurement was depicted at the bottom of 
columns 4 and 5 in both Figure 4.2a and Figure 4.2b.  For the variable group, the 
average number of changes in majority party in the state House of Representatives was 
2.167 changes.  This is only slightly less than the average number of changes that were 
found for the control group.  The control group’s average number of changes in 
majority party in the House of Representatives was 2.25 changes.  The same occurrence 
was found in the state Senates.  For the variable group, the average number of changes 
in majority party in the state Senate was 1.0834 changes.  This is less than the average 
number of changes in the state Senate for the control group, which averaged 1.4167 
changes.  
The data do show a small number of changes overall in the time period of 
measurement for the variable group, suggesting that the hypothesis was correct.  
However, while the control group experienced slightly more changes than the variable 
group, the control group experienced very few changes as well.  While it appears that 
there is a correlation between the adoption of the merit system and a state legislature 
that has experienced very few changes in majority party, it seems unlikely that such a 
situation actually has an impact on the adoption of the merit system. 
4.3 Hypothesis 3   
The third hypothesis predicted that states that adopted the merit system were more 
likely to be surrounded by other states that had already adopted the merit system than 
are states that did not adopt the merit system.  This hypothesis was tested by 
comparing eight states that have adopted the merit system – the variable group – to 
eight states that have not adopted the merit system – the control group.  The states in the 
control group were Iowa, South Dakota, Wyoming, Colorado, Kansas, Tennessee, 
Oklahoma, and Nebraska.  All of the states selected for the variable group were mid-
western states.  The states in the control group were also mid-western states and 
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included Kentucky, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Arkansas, New Mexico, and North 
Dakota.  All sixteen states that were selected for study are connected to each other, 
(there are no stand-alone states), and are all Midwestern states.  These states were 
selected in an attempt to only compare states that were geographically and socio-
economically similar. 
The data for the variable-group study are recorded in Figure 4.3a below.  Column 1 
lists the states that were studied.  These states have all adopted the merit system.  
Column 2 lists the number of states that share a border with the state in column 1.  
Column 3 lists the years in which the merit system was adopted for each state.  Column 
4 lists the number of bordering states, (of the number listed in column 2), that had 
already adopted the merit system by the year (listed in column 3) that the state being 
examined adopted the merit system. Column 5 gives the percentage of bordering states that 
were already employing the merit system in the year the merit system was adopted in 
the state in the corresponding row listed in column 1.  The averaged total numbers 
listed in columns 2, 4, and 5 are listed in the bottom row of Figure 4.3a. 
The data for the control group is presented in Figure 4.3b below.  The data is 
presented in the exact same format as the data in Figure 4.3a, with the exception of the 
date listed in Column 3.  The date listed in column 3 of Figure 4.3b is 1973.  This was the 
average date on which the twelve states from Figure 4.2a adopted the merit system.  
This average date was used as the date of measurement for the control group.  For each 
state listed in column 1 of Figure 4.3b, the number of bordering states which were 
employing the merit system in 1973 was measured.  




2. Number of 
Surrounding 
States* 








Iowa 7 1962 2 28.60% 
South Dakota 6 1980 3 50% 
Wyoming 6 1972 1 16.67% 
Colorado 7 1966 1 14.29% 
Kansas 4 1972 3 75% 
Tennessee 8 1971, 1994 1 12.50% 
Oklahoma 6 1987 3 50% 
Nebraska 6 1962 1 16.67% 
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Average Total: 6.25 Average Total: 1.875 32.97% 
*All data in Figure 4.3a was derived from the National Center for State Courts (2015). 
 
Figure 4.3b – Control Group 
1. States  
2. Number of 
Surrounding 
States 










Kentucky 7 2 28.57% 
Illinois 5 3 60.00% 
Wisconsin 4 1 25% 
Minnesota 4 1 25% 
Arkansas 6 2 33.34% 
New Mexico 5 1 20% 
North Dakota 3 0 0.00% 
Average Total: 4.875 Average Total: 1.375 26.49% 
*All data in Figure 4.3b was derived from the National Center for State Courts (2015). 
 
The results of the study are consistent with the original hypothesis.  The original 
hypothesis predicted that states that adopted the merit system were more likely to be 
surrounded by other states that had already adopted the merit system than were states 
that did not adopt the merit system.  As the data in the above two tables shows, states 
that adopted the merit system, (the variable group), were bordered by both a greater 
number and greater percentage of states that had already adopted the merit system.  
States that had not adopted the merit system – the variable group – were bordered by 
less merit-system-employing states than the variable group.  On average, almost 33% of 
the states bordering variable-group states had already adopted the merit system.  Only 
26% of the variable group states were bordered by states that had already adopted the 
merit system.   
5. Conclusion 
Based on all of the data that was analyzed when testing the three hypotheses, 
several conclusions can be drawn, in addition to the conclusions already drawn above.  
While the evidence does not overwhelmingly support the assertion that a Republican-
controlled state legislature was more likely to implement the merit system, the data 
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does suggest that such is the case.  A similar statement can be made with regard to the 
level of majority-party consistency in the years leading up to the adoption of the merit 
system in the examined states.  While the data does overwhelmingly establish that 
states that have not adopted the merit system experience more changes in majority 
party in their state legislature, the data does suggest that such may be the case.  Lastly, 
the data also seems to suggest that states that adopt the merit system are likely to be 
bordered by other states already utilizing the merit system, although the data is not 
conclusive on the subject. 
The only definitive conclusion that can be reached from the results of this study is 
that more research is needed.  There are many other political factors besides the ones 
researched for this paper that may lead to the adoption of the merit system.  Such things 
as the effect of interest groups on state politics at the time of the adoption the merit 
system may lend insight into the subject.  Also, voter demographics may play role in 
the process.  One other area of possible research into the subject is the concept of 
reapportionment in the states, and more specifically how reapportionment relates to the 
afore-mentioned factors with relation to changing judicial selection methods.  These 
areas of study and more, along with the research presented in this paper, could lend 
valuable insight into the nature of changing political practices and values in the United 
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